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Third time lucky? An Exploration of Hutchison Whampoa's
Involvement in the Mobile Telecommunications Industry
Introduction
Given the size and global nature of the telecommunications industry, it is no surprise that several telecommunications companies can be found listed among the 100 largest non-financial corporations. These comprise Vodafone (3 rd ), Telefónica (18 th ) and TeliaSonera (75 th ) (UNCTAD, 2010) . However, a closer examination of the list reveals another significant player in the global telecommunications industry, namely Hutchison Whampoa.
With assets of more than US$70 billion, Hutchison Whampoa is described as 'diversified' and hence is not readily associated with the telecommunications industry. Nevertheless, it has had a long, significant and arguably quite successful presence in the industry. Since the late 1980s, Hutchison Whampoa has invested in several sectors of the industry -mobile, fixed-wire, cable and equipment -and has actively managed its investments, expanding into new markets while divesting itself of others.
It is the continued presence of Hutchison Whampoa in the telecommunications industry that is the focus of this paper. As a diversified company or conglomerate, it is reasonable to expect that Hutchison would move capital between different industries as it seeks to maximize its returns. Such a strategy would be in keeping with conglomerates such as Gulf & Western, Hanson or ITT. 1 In contrast, Hutchison seems to be willing to re-invest in the telecommunications sector, perhaps because two of its previous investments -in Orange plc in the UK and in the Indian mobile marketwere highly profitable. Moreover, there does not appear to be any desire on its part to narrow its focus to overcome what has been called the 'diversification discount '. 2 For example, after decades of diversification, ITT narrowed its focus twice. In 1995, the company shed many of the subsidiaries accumulated under Harold Geneen in order to focus on three areas, before announcing in January 2011 that it would again split itself up (Crooks and Thomas, 2011) . Hanson also broke itself up, dividing into four listed companies (Stonham, 1997a (Stonham, & 1997b . This desire for focus is also evident in conglomerates with a narrower focus. For example, Philip Morris separated its tobacco business from its confectionary and food businesses in 2001 when it spun off Kraft Foods 3 , which, in turn, has announced its own separation into two businesses (Thomas, Rappeport, Pickford and Lucas, 2011) .
While some conglomerates have broken themselves up, others appear to be thriving in a wide range of countries. Financial Times (2011) identifies conglomerates in both emerging markets (Hong Kong and Qatar) and developed countries (Germany and Japan), while Khanna and Palepu (1999) find them present in Korea, India and Turkey. From Chang (2006) it is clear that conglomerates exist throughout Asia. It is within this context of not needing to narrow down its focus that the willingness of Hutchison Whampoa to invest repeatedly in the telecommunications industry needs to be placed. Hutchison Whampoa has continued to invest even though it has found building a third-generation (3G) mobile business from scratch more challenging and protracted than anticipated. 4 It has used the proceeds from the sale of Orange and its Indian mobile operations to fund this continued investment, and while it has (arguably) invested successfully in mobile telecommunications in the past, this does not guarantee that it will be able to repeat this feat.
With this in mind, the remainder of the paper is divided into five sections. A brief overview of Hutchison Whampoa is presented in Section 2, and is followed in Section 3 by an outline of how the company's presence in the telecommunications industry has evolved over time. In Section 4, Hutchison's presence is explored along three dimensions, namely geographical footprint, number of subscribers and financial performance. The issues raised in the previous sections are discussed in Section 5, with conclusions being drawn in the final section of the paper.
Hutchison Whampoa
Hutchison Whampoa is a Hong Kong-based conglomerate. According to the most recent FT Global 500 ranking, it ranks 150 th among the largest companies in the world with sales of $26.9 billion and net income of $2.57 billion (Financial Times, 2011) . The present size and scope of Hutchison Whampoa is the result of diversification and significant internationalization. During the period 1995 to 2010, Hutchison Whampoa's revenues grew almost tenfold from HK$35 billion to HK$325.9 billion (Hutchison Whampoa, 1997 and 2011a) . Profits, however, did not grow to the same extent over this period. While Hutchison Whampoa was consistently profitable, profits fluctuated between a low of HK$8.7 billion in 1998 to a high of HK$117.3 billion in 1999 (Hutchison Whampoa, 1999 and 2000 . Setting aside the profits reported in 1999, which were largely due to the one-off contribution from the sale of the company's stake in Orange, there has been a general increase in the company's profitability.
As befits a conglomerate, Hutchison Whampoa is engaged in a diverse array of industries and its structure can be described as complex. Hutchison Whampoa divides its operations into five areas, namely ports and related services, property and hotels, retail, telecommunications, and energy, infrastructure, investments and others. These activities are organised into a bewildering array of holding companies, subsidiaries and joint ventures. Some, but by no means all, of these activities are wholly-owned and eight subsidiaries and associated companies are listed on stock exchanges.
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It is also worth noting that Hutchison Whampoa is itself 49.9 per cent-owned by Cheung Kong Holdings, which describes itself as a being the 'flagship of the Cheung Kong Group' that encompasses Hutchison Whampoa as well as, among others, Cheung Kong Infrastructure Holdings Limited, Hutchison Harbour Ring Limited and Power Assets Holdings Limited. 6 Some, but not all, of the companies identified as being part of the Cheung Kong Group are also part-owned by Hutchison Whampoa.
Due to the small size of its home market and the nature of the industries in which it has invested, Hutchison Whampoa is also highly internationalized. Since 1990, UNCTAD has published details of the largest multinational corporations 7 in terms both of size (revenues, assets etc.) and the extent to which they are internationalized. Hutchison Whampoa entered the list of the largest 100 multinational corporations by assets in 1999 at number 48 (UNCTAD, 2001) . The following year, Hutchison Whampoa rose to be the 14 th -largest multinational corporation when measured by foreign assets (UNCTAD, 2002) . In subsequent years, Hutchison Whampoa's position in the rankings fell away, so that in 2008 it was the 25 th -largest multinational corporation when measured by foreign assets (UNCTAD, 2010).
Hutchison Whampoa's involvement in the telecommunications industry
Figure I depicts the current scope of Hutchison Whampoa's involvement in the telecommunications industry. Hutchison's involvement is undertaken through a series of holding companies which have, over the years, experienced significant changes. Companies have not only been bought and sold but have also been floated on stock exchanges before being bought back by Hutchison Whampoa. These events are outlined in Table 1 . Table I about here]
The manner in which Hutchison's involvement in the industry has evolved, coupled with its propensity to move assets between companies and engage in merger and acquisition activities, means that disentangling these developments is not straightforward. Each of the holding companies identified on Figure 1 will be discussed in turn, beginning with Hutchison Telecommunications Hong Kong Ltd. This company can trace its origins back to the 1996 creation of Hutchison Telecommunications (Hong Kong) to manage all of Hutchison Whampoa's telecommunication businesses in Hong Kong (Hutchison Whampoa, 1997) . At that time, these consisted of mobile, fixed-wire and paging services. In 1999, half of the fixed-wire and Internet operations in Hong Kong were sold to Global Crossing, with the new company being renamed Hutchison Global Crossing (Hutchison Whampoa, 2000) . Parts of the company's mobile operations were also sold in the same year; a 19 per cent stake in Hutchison Telephone was sold to NTT DoCoMo with the consequence that Hutchison Telecommunications (Hong Kong) held a 55.9 per cent stake and Motorola 25.1 per cent (Hutchison Whampoa, 2000) . Just a year later, however, Hutchison acquired the stake held by Motorola, thereby increasing its ownership of Hutchison Telephone to 81 per cent (Hutchison Whampoa, 2001 (Hutchison Whampoa, 2010a: 48) . As a result of this divestment, Hutchison Whampoa became a direct shareholder of the company with a 62.6 per cent stake. This company provides fixed-wire and mobile telecommunication services within Hong Kong and Macau.
Another one of the holding companies identified in Figure I The SEC inquiry coincided with the decision by Hutchison Whampoa to 'privatize' HTIL. Indeed, the 2009 Annual Report states that HTIL agreed to amend its accounts so as not to delay the shareholder vote on its privatization (Hutchison Whampoa, 2010a: 50) . This privatization would see Hutchison Whampoa acquire the outstanding stock in HTIL at HK$2.20 per share (Hutchison Whampoa, 2010b) . The proposal document highlighted two pertinent issues. The first was that the remaining operations of HTIL, once those sold in India and Israel and spun off in Hong Kong and Macau were taken into account, lacked scale. The second was that none of the remaining operations were among the largest three in their respective markets and although Hutchison Whampoa was confident of their long-term potential, achieving this potential would require investment in the short/medium term.
When coupled with the fall in the market capitalization of HTIL from HK$95.6 billion to HK$7.9 billion and the limited 'free float' of its shares, Hutchison Whampoa argued that it was no longer appropriate for it to be listed on the stock exchange. Moreover, in removing the pressures associated with being a public company, Hutchison Whampoa stated that it would be better placed to manage the business and make the appropriate investment decisions (Hutchison Whampoa, 2010b) . On 24 May 2010, Hutchison Whampoa announced that the Grand Court of the Cayman Islands, where HTIL was incorporated, had approved the privatization of the company, and that it was expected to become effective on the following day (Hutchison Whampoa, 2010c and 2010d Whampoa, 2001: 28ff) . Hutchison Whampoa explicitly states that it is reinvesting part of the proceeds from the sale of Orange plc. in the acquisition of 3G licences. In Austria, the wholly-owned Hutchison 3G Austria paid €139 million for its licence, while in Italy and the UK the sums paid were considerably more at €3,254 million and £4,385 million respectively (Hutchison Whampoa, 2001: 29) . In contrast, a nominal fee was paid for the Swedish 3G licence.
The licences in Italy, Sweden and the UK were acquired through joint ventures. In November 2000, Andala SpA, a consortium headed by Tiscali, was awarded a 3G licence (Curwen and Whalley, 2006a: 629) To offset the costs of rolling out a national infrastructure, Hi3G Access joined with two other 3G licence winners in Sweden, Orange Sverige and Vodafone, to form 3GIS. This company would build a 3G infrastructure covering the 70 per cent of the Swedish population living outside the three main urban areas of Gothenburg, Malmö/Lund and Stockholm/Uppsala. Hi3G Access is unusual as it has acquired 3G licences of its own in other Nordic markets. In September 2001, the company successfully bid DKr950 million for a 3G licence in Denmark (Hutchison Whampoa, 2002: 27) , and NKr62 million for a 3G licence in Norway (Hutchison Whampoa, 2004: 27) . Interestingly, the annual report states that the Norwegian business would be developed as an extension of those in Denmark and Sweden. In other words, Hutchison Whampoa viewed the three markets of Denmark, Norway and Sweden as being closely intertwined with one another.
The final West European market in which 3 Group is present is Ireland. In June 2002, the wholly-owned Hutchison 3G Ireland paid $50 million for the largest of the available licences (Curwen and Whalley, 2006a: 629 
Operational performance

Geographical footprint
The geographical footprint of Hutchison is presented in Table II. This table identifies (2008 to 2011) to the present total of 13. Secondly, the main geographical focus of Hutchison's various international investments has been in the Asia-Pacific region and Western Europe. Although the company has invested outside these two regions in countries such as Argentina, Ghana, Paraguay and the United States, these investments have been relatively short-lived. Hutchison entered these four countries only to leave a few years later. Nevertheless, the shortest time spent by Hutchison in a country was in Western Europe. In the cases of both Belgium and Switzerland, the company entered the market one year only to exit the next. As both investments were made by Orange plc, the exit from the market was due to the sale of that company to France Télécom.
[Insert Table II about here]
A third observation is that in the case of the UK, Hutchison exited the market only to re-enter it the following year. Hutchison exited the UK when it sold Orange only to re-enter the market in 2000 when it successfully participated in the 3G spectrum auction. Shortly after winning the fifth, and largest, 3G licence, Hutchison sold 35 per cent of the company to NTT DoCoMo (20 per cent) and KPN (15 per cent) for a total of £2.1 billion (NTT DoCoMo, 2000) . However, the relationship between the three partners was problematic, with KPN refusing to contribute additional funds in early 2003 to Hutchison 3G UK (Leahy and Nutall, 2003: 31) . In November of the same year, KPN agreed to sell back its shares to Hutchison for £90 million while in May 2004, NTT DoCoMo also agreed to sell its shares for £120 million. Hutchison completed the purchase of these shares in 2005 (Lau, 2005: 28) .
The equity held by Hutchison has also changed in other countries. Table II shows that in the case of India, Hutchison initially increased its ownership before expanding into other parts of the country. Hutchison launched its mobile operations in India in 1995, and was able to become the market leader in the Mumbai 'circle' (licence area) by the end of 1996 with more than 50,000 subscribers (Hutchison Whampoa, 1997) . The 1996 annual report states that Hutchison had an effective 29.4 per cent stake in its Indian mobile business. During 1998, Hutchison increased its stake in its Indian mobile business -Hutchison Max Telecommunications -to 49.5 per cent, and subscribed to the preference shares of another company holding a large stake in Hutchison Max (Hutchison Whampoa, 1999: 26) .
Purchases of other mobile operators expanded the geographical footprint of Hutchison Max in India. In 2000, it acquired a 49 per cent interest in three GSM operators in the New Delhi, Calcutta and Gujarat state circles (Hutchison Whampoa, 2001: 28) , and further expanded in the following year when it paid $99 million for mobile licences in Karnataka, Andhra Pradesh and Chennai (Hutchison Whampoa, 2002: 28) . In January 2006, it acquired BPL Mobile Cellular which, when combined with the pending purchases of BPL Mobile Communications and Essar Spacetel, would expand the company's footprint in India to 23 circles (Hutchison Whampoa, 2006: 47) . In other words, Hutchison would have a substantial presence across India.
Unlike the case of India where Hutchison increased both its ownership and geographical footprint over time, the latter seems to be the driving force in Australia.
Hutchison has been present in Australia since 1989 when it started offering paging services (Hutchison Telecommunications Australia, 2010) . At some point after 1989 but before 1997, the company also began to offer GSM-based mobile services and had 143,000 subscribers by the end of 1997 (Hutchison Whampoa, 1998) .
10 During 1997, Hutchison also increased its stake in its Australian joint venture from 56 per cent to 70 per cent (Hutchison Whampoa, 1998) . In 1998, the company was awarded CDMA licences covering Sydney and Melbourne, and signed a national roaming agreement with Telstra in the following year (Hutchison Telecommunications Australia, 2010) . 1999 also saw the initial public offering (IPO) of Hutchison Telecommunications Australia, raising A$235 million to fund the construction of the company's CDMA network (Hutchison Whampoa, 2000) . As a result of the IPO, Hutchison's stake in its Australian business fell to 54 per cent. (Vodafone, 2009 ). This enabled the joint venture to be owned equally by the two companies. Although the creation of Vodafone Hutchison Australia was accompanied by the licensing of the '3' brand, several commentators took the view that the brand would only be used in the short term, unlike that of Vodafone (Sainsbury, 2009; Vodafone, 2009) . At the heart of the merger was the desire to improve the performance of both mobile businesses through expanding network coverage, gaining scale economies and combining their different strengths (Middleton, 2009; Sainsbury, 2009) .
Geographical expansion within a country has also played a role in Thailand and the United States, albeit arguably to a lesser extent than in Australia or India. Hutchison has been present in Thailand since 2002. Its presence in the country, in terms of the structure and nature of the investments, is significantly influenced by the unique approach to the telecommunications sector that has been adopted in Thailand. Hutchison, through HTIL, held stakes in two companies in Thailand: Hutchison CAT Wireless Multimedia Ltd and BFKT (Thailand) Ltd (Hutchison Telecommunications International Limited, 2006) . The former provided mobile telecommunication services using cdma2000 1xRTT while the latter was a network leasing company. Limits on the foreign ownership of companies in Thailand resulted in a complex organizational structure being adopted. As outlined in the 2005 Annual Report of HTIL, two companies owned Hutchison CAT: Hutchison Wireless (73.9 per cent) and CAT Telecom (26 per cent). In turn, 49 per cent of Hutchison Wireless was owned by HTIL and 41 per cent by GMRP (Thailand) Ltd. Three individual shareholders owned the remaining 10 per cent. The voting strength of the shares also differed; HTIL's shares carried one vote per share while GMRP's shares were considerably weaker at one vote per 20 shares. GMRP held the shares in Hutchison Wireless on behalf of HTIL, and its articles of association were such that HTIL could direct it to buy more equity in Hutchison Wireless or sell the shares that it held to another company that it designated.
11 Through this arrangement of cascading stakes, HTIL controlled a 36.2 per cent economic interest in Hutchison CAT. Although some of the equity stakes have changed in subsequent years, the structure as described remains essentially the same.
Within Thailand, the footprint of Hutchison CAT covered 25 out of the country's 76 provinces (Hutchison Telecommunications International Ltd, 2008) . Although these provinces accounted for the majority of Thailand's economic output, a significant proportion of the population was obviously unable to access Hutchison CAT services. (Hutchison Whampoa, 2010a: 50) . In April 2010, CAT Telecom was given government approval to purchase Hutchison CAT for THB7.5 billion (Telegeography, 2010a) . However, the appointment of a new board at CAT Telecom resulted in the acquisition initially being questioned before the government ordered CAT Telecom to pay no more than THB4 billion (Telegeography, 2010b (Telegeography, , 2010c (Telegeography, and 2010d . With Hutchison refusing to accept such a sum, the sale to CAT Telecom collapsed allowing True to acquire Hutchison's operations in Thailand for THB4.35 billion (Telegeography, 2010e). The sale was completed in early 2011 (Hutchison Whampoa, 2011; Telegeography, 2011a Whampoa, 2000) . By the time these mergers had been completed, Hutchison's stake in VoiceStream had risen to 23 per cent (Hutchison Whampoa, 2000) . 12 In July 2000, VoiceStream agreed to merge with Deutsche Telekom in a deal worth $50.7 billion plus the assumption of $4.2 billion of debt (Curwen and Whalley, 2004: 16) 
Mobile subscribers
Although Hutchison has invested in fixed-wire markets, the main investment focus has been towards mobile markets. As can be seen from Figure II , the number of mobile subscribers has risen almost sevenfold since 2003. As of December 2010, the various mobile operations of Hutchison had collectively 33.4 million proportionate (adjusted for the size of the equity stake) subscribers. Although this makes Hutchison in its entirety a large operator, two caveats need to be taken into account. Firstly, in the context of the global mobile telecommunications industry, Hutchison is not a large operator. Curwen and Whalley (2006b) propose a methodology for assessing internationalization in the mobile telecommunications industry.
13 Updating Curwen and Whalley (2006b) to the end of 2010 reveals that Hutchison is the 23 rd -largest mobile operator globally when measured by the number of proportionate subscribers. Moreover, Hutchison's subscriber base is such that it is located towards the lower end of the list of mobile operators with international footprints on any scale. 
Financial performance
Determining the financial performance of Hutchison Whampoa in the telecommunications industry is not straightforward. Apart from the seemingly constant restructuring of its various telecommunication operations noted above, determining the financial success of Hutchison is complicated by two other factors: firstly, the company has frequently restated its revenues and profits and, secondly, EBIT/LBIT (earnings/loss before interest and taxation) is used to calculate 3 Group profits. The use of EBIT/LBIT is unusual to say the least, as it leaves out depreciation and amortization. annual report are presented rather than subsequent restatements. The first observation we can make is that the profits from the telecommunications division are rather modest, in both absolute terms and when compared to the extraordinary items. From the table it would appear that the telecommunications division produced its highest profit in 1996, though this is slightly misleading as the total for that year, HK$3,642 million, included an unspecified profit from the initial public offering of its UK-based mobile operator, Orange plc. Profits after extraordinary items fall after 1997, and slowly climb back to a broadly similar level over the next six years. Even so, the level of profits reported by the telecommunications division of Hutchison remains relatively modest when compared to the extraordinary items reported. The substantial figure for 1999 is composed of the sale of equity in Orange and the initial public offering of Partner Communications in Israel. Unravelling the aftermath of the Mannesmann/Vodafone merger contributed to the large level of extraordinary items for 2000, as did the sale of equity in two other Hutchison telecommunication businesses. Together, the extraordinary items for these two years amount to HK$138.4 billion, or more than £11 billion at the current exchange rate.
[Insert Table III about here]
The picture presented in Table IV is more complicated, reflecting changes to Hutchison's organizational structure and the tendency of the company to report income including extraordinary items. Nevertheless, it appears that HTIL reported profits of almost HK$67 billion although this is primarily due to the sale of the company's operations in India to Vodafone for HK$69.3 billion . In other words, without this sale HTIL would be loss-making in 2007. Extraordinary items appear to be determining the profitability of HTIL -the loss incurred on the sale of the Paraguayan operations is only partially offset by the gain from the sale of equity in Hutchison Global Crossing Holdings, resulting in a loss overall for 2005. Extraordinary items contribute to the profits reported in 2008 and 2009, although the extent to which this is the case is unclear given the manner in which they are reported. Although 2010 saw two extraordinary items, amounting to almost HK$1 billion, being reported against HAT, the company was still loss-making overall.
[Insert Table IV about here]
Table IV suggests that 3 Group has been profitable twice since 2004; that is, in 2005 and 2010. This is arguably misleading as the profits for 2005 were subsequently restated in the following year using a different methodology, resulting in the company reported a loss . Between 2004 and 2009 (inclusive) , the losses incurred by 3 Group amounted to HK$97.7 billion. This is a considerable sum, but it amounts to less than half of the profits Hutchison made from selling assets in just three years (1999, 2000 and 2007) . In these three years, extraordinary items totalled HK$207.8 billion. In other words, the losses incurred by 3 Group were less than half of the income gained from the sale of Orange and Hutchison's Indian operations. Interestingly, Hunt (2010) After taking into account the restatement for 2005, there is only a single year in which 3 Group has been profitable. While a series of extraordinary items did contribute to the group's profitability in 2010, the various 3G mobile businesses within the group also performed strongly. Every operation except that in Ireland reported positive EBIT in the second half of 2010 (Hutchison Whampoa, 2011a) . While Table III charts the gradual financial improvement of 3 Group's various mobile businesses, it does not shed any light on the individual performance of these operations. Until recently, the review of Hutchison's telecommunications operations in the annual report did not provide detailed figures regarding the profit or loss of its various businesses, and instead relied on terms such as '151% better than last year' in the case of Italy or, in the case of Sweden and Denmark, 'first full-year positive EBITDA' to describe performance (Hutchison Whampoa, 2007: 55) .
[Insert Table V about here]
By combining qualitative descriptions of the financial performance of the various businesses within 3 Group with the quantitative statements that are available, Table V 14 The more detailed information that is available for 2009 and 2010 highlights a second issue, namely the relatively low profitability of the various businesses. The most profitable country would appear to be the UK, followed by Italy. This is perhaps unsurprising when the large populations, and thus subscriber bases, of Hutchison in these two countries, are taken into account. In contrast, the profits made in four countries combined -Australia, Austria, Denmark and Sweden -are less than those made in Italy. In other words, the overall profitability of 3 Group is largely dependent on just two markets, Italy and the United Kingdom.
As noted above, extraordinary items play a significant role in determining the profitability of HTIL. Although Table IV clearly demonstrates that HTIL has been profitable more times than it has made a loss, even when the extraordinary item in 2007 is taken into account, it does not shed light on the performance of individual businesses which is presented in Table VI . It is clear from Table VI that the mobile operations in some countries -Indonesia and Vietnam -have never been profitable, while others -Sri Lanka and Thailand -have flipped between profitability and lossmaking. In contrast, the mobile operations in India and Israel were profitable throughout the period they were owned by HTIL. It is not clear why HTIL would choose to sell both of its consistently profitable mobile businesses, though the sales would conceivably generate revenue that could sustain losses elsewhere as these businesses edged towards profitability as well as fund new investments.
[Insert Table VI about here]
The fixed-wire and mobile operations in Hong Kong and Macau are consistently profitable throughout the period in question. As shown in Figure III, 
Discussion
Sections 3 and 4 have charted Hutchison Whampoa's involvement in the telecommunications industry. It is clear from both of these sections that the company's involvement is not straight-forward. The organizational structure that has been adopted is complex, involving a series of listed holding companies that are connected to the operating companies through another tier of intermediate companies.
Hutchison Whampoa has actively engaged in the sale and purchase of companies. Two of these sales have been highly successful -the sale of Orange plc. to France Télécom and of the Indian operations to Vodafone. But can Hutchison Whampoa repeat this feat for a third time?
Hutchison Whampoa has used a significant proportion of the proceeds from the sales of Orange and its Indian operations to fund the development of 3 Group. As a result of the acquisition of a series of 3G licences and the launch of mobile services in seven countries, 3 Group now accounts for two-thirds of all mobile subscribers controlled by Hutchison Whampoa. While 3 Group has fared better in some countries than others, it remains the smallest operator when measured by mobile subscribers in all the markets where it is present. The description of HTIL as 'lacking scale' when it was taken private by Hutchison Whampoa arguably applies to 3 Group. As a consequence, it is unlikely that Hutchison Whampoa will be able to float all or part of 3 Group, either in its entirety or in individual countries, for sums that would begin to repay the investment.
Since 2006, Hutchison Whampoa has published more detailed financial data regarding the performance of 3 Group. This data are presented below in Table VII and enable an initial assessment of the performance of 3 Group to be made. With respect to revenue, Table VII highlights the decline that has been experienced in Italy, with revenues falling by 18 per cent between 2006 and 2010. Revenues have also declined in the UK, albeit by only 1.6 per cent. In contrast, revenues have increased in Australia, Austria, and Denmark and Sweden (which are reported together), with the rise being particularly significant in the case of the former two countries.
[Insert Table Vii about here]
A more uniform picture is presented by the other two performance measures that appear in Table VII . In all cases, average revenue per user (ARPU) has declined. In those countries where revenues have increased -Austria, Australia and Denmark and Sweden (combined) -this would suggest that subscriber numbers in these countries have also increased, sometimes substantially so. Although the declines indicate a deterioration in 3 Group's financial performance, the rate at which ARPU has fallen has slowed in four cases -Australia, Austria, Denmark and Sweden (combined) and the UK -and has even been reversed, albeit only marginally, in Italy in recent years. A contributory factor to arresting this decline has been the shifting balance of ARPU composition. The proportion of ARPU accounted for by non-voice products has increased in all cases, with a majority of ARPU in Austria and Ireland now coming from non-voice sources.
It is informative to compare 3 Group to the other operators against which it competes. Merrill Lynch publishes quarterly reports detailing the performance of operators in 35 different countries. However, not all of the countries where 3 Group operates are included in the Merrill Lynch reports, nor does it cover all of the operators present in each of the markets and the data do not appear to correspond with data published by Hutchison Whampoa in its annual reports. As such, any analysis needs to be treated with a degree of caution. Nevertheless, Merrill Lynch (2010) does provide sufficient data in two countries to see how well 3 Group has performed compared to its competitors. According to Merrill Lynch (2010), 3 Italia had a higher APRU than TIM, Vodafone and Wind at the end of 2006. Although the APRU of all operators subsequently fell, it fell fastest for 3 Italia so that by the end of 2009 the situation had completely reversed itself -3 Italia now had the lowest ARPU. The declining financial position has encouraged, once again, rumours that 3 Italia will be sold to one of its competitors (Telegeography, 2011b). The situation is somewhat different in the UK. In parallel with the other operators in the UK market, 3 UK has witnessed an ARPU decline between the end-2006 and end-2009, but it has remained the highest among the five mobile network operators in the market. 16 The incomplete nature of the data included in Merrill Lynch (2010) means that it is difficult to compare 3 Group companies to their competitors on other performance measures. Nevertheless, sufficient data are provided to compare year-on-year service revenue growth in three countries, Austria, Italy and the UK. In Figure IV , the yearon-year service revenue growth of '3' is compared against the country average, with a positive figure indicating that '3' service revenues grew faster than the country average and a negative figure that they grew more slowly.
[Insert Figure IV about here]
In two countries, Italy and the UK, service revenues initially grew at a much faster rate than the country average. However, this is not that surprising when the law of large numbers is taken into account -in both countries '3' was growing from a relatively small subscriber base, unlike its competitors. Over three years the growth rate declines, so that by 2007 it is more or less aligned in both countries with the market average. In Austria, '3' has grown faster than the country average on three occasions, but on only one occasion has the growth rate been substantially higher.
Merrill Lynch (2010) (Middleton, 2007) .
18 Through sharing masts and the 3G access network, an estimated £2 billion would be saved over 10 years.
Conclusions
This paper has outlined the presence of Hutchison Whampoa in the telecommunications industry. Through doing so, the scope and complexity of Hutchison Whampoa's involvement has been demonstrated. As markets have been entered and exited, businesses around the world have been bought and sold. Hutchison Whampoa has also made extensive use of holdings companies, some of which have been listed on various stock exchanges, as well as intermediate companies that link these holding companies to the various operating companies.
The scale and scope of Hutchison Whampoa's involvement in the telecommunications industry provides the context for the question that this paper has sought to address, namely, whether it will be able to repeat its previous successes of Orange and its Indian mobile businesses. Both of these were sold for a considerable amount, enabling Hutchison Whampoa to fund the development of 3 Group. This development, however, has not been straightforward with a consequence that it has consumed a significant proportion of the sum raised from the sale of Orange and the Indian mobile business.
But has this investment resulted in a successful business? The picture is mixed. In those markets where it is present, 3 Group is the smallest operator and APRU has fallen. Moreover, where data are available, year-on-year revenue growth is no better than its competitors. Nevertheless, 3 Group is profitable in all bar one of its markets and it has been able to switch the balance of revenue towards non-voice sources. Even so, the relatively small size of 3 Group makes its purchase by another operator unlikely. Quite simply, the criticism levelled by Hutchison Whampoa against HTIL as it was being 'privatized', namely, that it lacked scale, also applies to 3 Group. A more likely development would be the piecemeal sale of 3 Group, though the prices that the various businesses would fetch are limited by the lack of potential bidders in each case. For example, in the UK there are three potential bidders while in Italy there are just two other operators who could use the opportunity to acquire a rival and improve their scale economies. As the various parts of 3 Group are unlikely to fetch large sums and their operational performance is mixed, it is not going to be 'third time lucky' for Hutchison Whampoa.
Notes
1.
See, for example, Attiyeh (1969) , Hopper and Macintosh (1993) , Kerr and Darroch (2005) , Sampson (1973) and Sobel (1982) .
2.
The 'diversification discount' refers to the notion that as a company diversifies away from its original business, value is destroyed. Thus, highly diversified companies are valued at a discount to their more narrowly focused counterparts. For further details see, for example, Anjos (2010) or Schmid and Walter (2009 
13.
The four dimensions for measuring internationalization as suggested in Curwen & Whalley (2006) are the number of countries, the number of proportionate subscribers, the number of proportionate subscribers by region and psychic dispersion.
14. It is worth treating the reported profits and losses for Australia with a degree of caution. In 2004, Hutchison stated its net loss attributable to shareholders to be A$522 million (Hutchison Whampoa, 2004) . The following year, the loss of A$547 million was reported as being a 21 per cent improvement on the previous year's results (Hutchison Whampoa, 2005 
